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Highlights 
 Three studies (N=107,087) tested personal values as motivations for unethicality 
 Personal values followed a theorized sinusoidal relationship with unethicality 
 Self‐enhancement values: high unethicality; Conservation values: low unethicality 
 Self‐transcendence values: low unethicality with prosocial/harm considerations 
 Openness‐to‐change values: motivated unethicality, dependent on context 
Abstract 
We theorized and tested the relationship of personal value systems with unethical attitudes and 
behavior. Results from three studies using 16 diverse multi-national samples (N = 107,087) 
demonstrated the complexity of motivations underlying unethicality. Across contexts and 
cultures, for attitudes (Study 1 meta-analysis) and behaviors in the lab (Study 2) and in real-life 
(Study 3), we consistently found that the values theory circumplex structure predicted the 
inhibition and motivation of unethicality. Unethicality was positively associated with self-
enhancement values and negatively associated with self-transcendence and conservation values. 
However, self-transcendence and conservation values were associated with the inhibition of 
different types of unethicality. The relationship of openness-to-change values with unethicality 
was generally positive but the effect size varied depending on context.  
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The motivation and inhibition of breaking the rules: 
Personal values structures predict unethicality 
 
 
What drives people to act unethically? What drives people to inhibit unethicality? Recent 
ethics scandals in business and academia have highlighted the importance of understanding the 
motivations underlying unethical behavior (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; 
Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006; Pulfrey & Butera, 
2013). A common reaction to these scandals is that such behavior is due to failing moral 
standards caused by lack of values, calling societies and organizations to promote values that 
would reduce such behavior (e.g., Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005). Yet, despite this intuition 
that values would serve a critical role in motivating ethical decision making and behavior, there 
are important theoretical gaps in the understanding of how personal values are associated with 
ethics and whether some values are more desirable in inhibiting unethicality than others, and 
under what circumstances.  
The current investigation addresses these concerns by examining the motivational basis 
of unethicality using the theory of personal values (Schwartz, 1992) - long term desirable goals 
that reflect what is important to people in their lives. Values are especially relevant for morality 
and ethics as they guide one’s identity and help shape one’s self in reference to others (Hitlin & 
Piliavin, 2004). The values theory highlights a universally recognized and interrelated 
circumplex structure of inter-related values on two orthogonal bipolar dimensions - self-
enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness-to-change versus conservation (explained 
in detail below; Schwartz, 2011). The values circumplex structure enables the understanding of 
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motivational tensions underlying unethical attitudes and behavior. Using this theory, we examine 
the underlying long-term motivations associated with unethicality and suggest that personal 
values and their overarching circumplex structure are meaningfully related to and predictive of 
unethicality. Previous literature examining the relationship between personal values and 
unethicality has mostly focused on the relationship between individual values categories (e.g., 
achievement or self-enhancement) and under specific contexts (specific cultures or domains) 
resulting in mixed findings and inconsistent results (discussed below). We aim to extend 
previous literature by theorizing how the personal values circumplex structure, which 
encompasses universally recognized personal values and highlights the tensions between them, 
can serve as a theoretical basis for understanding the motivational tensions driving and inhibiting 
unethicality. Although ethics are generally considered contextual and culturally bound (Cullen, 
Parboteeah, & Hoegl, 2004; Haidt, 2001, 2008; Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012), we further aim 
to demonstrate that the universal structure of personal values predicts unethicality across 
demographics and cultures, suggesting that cultural differences in the endorsement of values can 
explain cultural differences in ethicality.  
We conducted three studies to examine the predictive powers of the personal values 
structure for unethicality, offering the following contributions: First, we examine the values-
unethicality link for both unethicality attitudes (Study 1) and actual unethical behavior (Study 2), 
with a first demonstration of the relationship in naturalistic behavior on Facebook (Study 3). 
Second, rather than focusing on a single value category, we examine values structures as a 
whole, showing a consistent theoretically driven sinusoidal relationship between values in the 
circumplex structure and unethicality. Finally, although ethical norms and morality are often 
regarded as complex notions that are dependent on personal views, culture, and context, we 
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demonstrate effects that extend across unethicality measures, sample characteristics, and 
cultures, and are therefore strikingly generalizable.  
Unethicality 
By unethicality we refer to both the intentions to engage, the attitudes towards, and the 
actual participation in behaviors that violate widely accepted social ethical norms (Rest & 
Barnett, 1986). Such behaviors may include lying (dishonesty), deceit, cheating, stealing, 
sabotage, and bribery as active behaviors, as well as behaviors that may appear less active such 
as concealment of others’ misconduct and violation of laws or prevalent moral codes through 
inaction.  
There has been growing interest in research examining determinants of unethicality with 
hundreds of studies in the last two decades, yet recent comprehensive reviews (O’Fallon & 
Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008; Trevino et al., 2006) and meta-analyses 
(Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Pan & Sparks, 2012) have revealed several important conceptual and 
empirical gaps in the literature. Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) reviewed 30 years of behavioral ethics 
and highlighted several important directions, calling for an overarching organizing theory that 
would help gain a better understanding of the underlying motivations that drive or inhibit 
unethical behavior and calling for studies with diverse methodology across samples. Trevino et 
al. (2006) recognized an over-emphasis of cognitive aspects over motivational drives in 
behavioral ethics research and have called for further research that would combine theory 
development with methodological rigor into this relatively neglected area of study.  
Personal Values 
To address calls in the ethics literature we examine the role of basic motivations – 
personal values. Personal values are abstract long-term motivational goals reflecting desirable 
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guiding principles and beliefs of what the person considers important in life (e.g., status, fairness; 
Schwartz, 1992). Values are considered central to the self, stable, enduring, universal, and 
transsituational (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990). The most widely used theory 
of personal values (Schwartz, 1992) groups personal values into ten categories of universal 
meaning that show consistent structure of relationships along two bi-polar dimensions on a two-
dimensional circular model – self enhancement (power, achievement, and sometimes hedonism) 
versus self-transcendence (benevolence, universalism) and openness to change (self-direction, 
stimulation, and sometimes hedonism) versus conservation (tradition, security, conformity). The 
relationship between different values follows a universally consistent circumplex pattern where 
values that share a motivation, and are therefore more likely to be closer in level of importance, 
appear closer on the circumplex (see Figure 1). Values appearing opposite to each other on the 
circumplex reflect tension between two opposing motivations. This theoretical conceptualization 
of values regards values as a system rather than as disconnected singular values (Schwartz, 1992, 
1996) and has found consistent empirical support across over 75 countries around the world 
(Schwartz, 2011). 
Personal values are transsituational and relatively stable motivational constructs and 
therefore differ from specific and more contextual goals (Maio, 2010). Values are considered 
inherently desirable representations of social cognitions that are generally accessible and quite 
easily articulated or discussed (for a discussion of the differences between personal values, 
attitudes, goals, needs, and traits, see Maio, 2010; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz & Knafo, 2002). The 
importance of one’s values to the self suggests that values should be reflected in behavior and 
choices made in life (Lewin, 1951). Although values are abstract concepts, there is ample 
evidence that personal values play a significant role in people’s attitudes, decision making 
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processes, and everyday life behaviors. This suggests that people who endorse certain values 
have stronger motivations to act on these values and thus tend to pursue behaviors that express 
these values (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Roccas & Sagiv, 2010).  
Personal values and unethicality 
Values are especially important in the cases of morality and ethics and their related 
behaviors as they are an internalization of social outlook which guides one’s identity and shapes 
one’s self in reference to others (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). Values form the basis for what 
constitutes legitimate behavior leading to the formation of moral perceptions and attitudes that 
may drive decisions to act or constrain action. Values are often ideals which people use to 
morally justify their actions to the self or articulate their moral beliefs, identity, and reasoning to 
their surroundings (Hitlin, 2011). Moreover, values and moral principles are both abstract guides 
of desirable and positive long term goals that transcend specific circumstances (Sverdlik, Roccas, 
& Sagiv, 2012). 
Until recently, studies examining the relationship between specific values and 
unethicality have shown very mixed findings and limited support (see supplementary materials 
for a summary of studies). For example, the link between achievement values and unethicality 
has been shown as both positive (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013; Watson, Berkley, & Papamarcos, 
2008) and negative (Glover, Bumpus, Logan, & Ciesla, 1997), with some studies finding 
conservation values to be negatively related to unethicality (Watson & Berkley, 2009), some 
showing mixed findings (Steenhaut & van Kenhove, 2006, one of four categories), while others 
do not find an effect at all (Fritzsche & Oz, 2007; Pulfrey & Butera, 2013). These mixed results 
may be attributed in part to the conceptualization of values (only 5 out of 17 studies employ the 
Schwartz personal values theory), the specific context or sample investigated, or methodological 
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issues (e.g., single item scenario measures, etc.). Importantly, few studies thus far have addressed 
the values circumplex structure as a whole and empirically tested their relationship across social 
contexts. 
The circumplex structure of personal values and the inherent conflict between values at 
the opposite ends of a dimension means that the promotion of certain value-expressive behaviors 
in a certain direction comes at the expense of value-expressive behaviors in the other direction 
(Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Frimer & Walker, 2009; Schwartz, 1996). For example, in line with 
the values theory, it has been argued that the promotion of capitalist values emphasizing self-
interest, a desire for personal financial success and competition between people, comes at the 
expense of more universalistic values that cultivate interpersonal relationships and helping 
behavior (Grant & Patil, 2012; Kasser, Cohn, Kanner, & Ryan, 2007). Therefore, the tension 
between conflicting interpretations of value-related behaviors is an integral part of the values 
circumplex structure (Tetlock, 1986). An action that reflects one value may violate values that 
are positioned on the opposing side of the bi-polar dimensions, meaning that any value-
motivated behavior entails a trade-off between competing values. Therefore, the positive and 
negative association with the different values would depend on their location in the values 
structure circumplex (Schwartz, 2010). As discussed below, unethicality and related behaviors 
may serve as an example for such inherent conflict between different personal values.  
Present investigation and hypotheses 
To develop hypotheses regarding the relationship between values and unethicality, we 
begin by presenting an overview of each bipolar value dimensions and their underlying values 
components. We then proceed to integrate the literature into a value system based model of 
unethicality.  
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Self-enhancement values emphasize the promotion of self over others. They include the 
personal values of power, achievement, and sometimes hedonism1. Power values express the 
importance and pursuit of control or dominance over resources and others, while achievement 
values highlight the pursuit of personal success according to social standards in a competitive 
environment (Schwartz, 2010). Self-enhancement values express the wish to promote selfish 
interests, even at the expense of others, thereby suggesting that a person endorsing achievement 
and power will be more likely to act with little consideration of society's ethical or moral codes. 
The behavioural ethics literature has shown that the concepts of power and wealth and the 
pursuit of achievement goals result in higher unethicality (e,g., Pulfrey & Butera, 2013; see 
supplementary materials Table 2 for list of studies), and based on these findings we theorize that 
self-enhancement values would predict higher unethicality2. On the other side of the values 
circumplex and in contrast to self-enhancement values is self-transcendence. Self-transcendence 
promotes the interests of others with the personal values of universalism and benevolence. These 
values express the motivations for empathy, justice, and fairness towards others (Grant, 2007, 
2008) and therefore tend to have a negative relationship with unethicality that involves harm to 
others (Schwartz, 2007; Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012). Previous findings have shown 
                                                 
1	Hedonism	is	sometimes	grouped	with	self‐enhancement	and	sometimes	with	openness	to	change	depending	
on	theoretical	implications.	To	make	theorizing	clear,	we	focus	only	on	power	and	achievement	in	self‐
enhancement.	
2	We	note	that	there	are	important	differences	between	possessing	power	and	valuing	power,	as	for	example,	
a	person	can	be	a	member	of	a	relatively	low	social	class	(low	power)	yet	still	value	power	(high	power	
values)	and	a	person	from	higher	social	class	(high	power)	can	value	universalism	more	than	power	(low	
power	values;	see	Piurko,	Schwartz,	&	Davidov,	2011	as	an	example	of	an	in‐depth	discussion	on	the	effects	of	
this	distinction	for	political	voting).	Similarly,	studies	examining	the	effects	of	achievement	goals	on	
unethicality	have	mainly	focused	on	short‐term	goals	and	tend	to	compare	different	types	of	achievement	
goals	(e.g.,	mastery	versus	performance,	see	Van	Yperen,	Hamstra	&	van	der	Klauw,	2011),	rather	than	to	
examine	the	centrality	of	achievement	values	in	one’s	life	and	the	importance	one	puts	on	achievement	as	
compared	to	other	values	in	the	values	circumplex	(Grant	&	Shin,	2011;	with	Pulfrey	&	Butera,	2013,	being	an	
exception).	
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benevolent ideals as important factors in the morality of people and organizations (e.g., Kish-
Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010). 
Orthogonal to self enhancement versus self transcendence on the values circumplex is the 
contrast between openness to change and conservation values. Conservation values, which 
include tradition, security, and conformity values, express the motivation for self-discipline, 
guiding the person to overcome one’s immediate desires in order to either conform to society, 
rules, norms, and traditions or to avoid danger. Conservation values motivate self-control, and 
self-control has been shown to reduce unethical behavior (e.g.. Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & 
Ariely, 2001). Furthermore, conservation values may inhibit antisocial behavior by increasing 
attention to the prevalent norms and the possible penalties for norm violation, as well as 
increasing motivation to belong to social circles thereby motivating the adherence to their set 
norms (Schwartz, 2007, 2010). In contrast to conservations values, openness-to-change values 
express openness in thought and action and include stimulation and self-direction values aimed 
to promote the interests of the individual (Schwartz, 1992). Of all the value dimensions this is the 
least straight-forward in its relationship with unethicality, though there are studies suggesting 
that people who pursue such motivations may be inclined to act in a more unethical manner (e.g., 
Gino & Ariely, 2012)3. Theoretically, there should not be an inherent motivation to behave 
unethically in openness to change values, although the aspect of having a free spirit embedded in 
openness to change values may lead to lowered adherence to rules in general. This may be 
particularly the case when the person does not agree with the rule, as openness to change values 
                                                 
3	Importantly,	these	studies	have	mostly	looked	at	self‐direction	and	stimulation	as	traits	rather	than	long‐
term	motivational	goals,	hence	they	do	not	clearly	reflect	motivations	but	can	be	seen	as	a	mixture	of	
recurrent	patterns	of	behavior,	thought,	and	affect	(for	a	discussion	of	the	differences	between	values	and	
traits	see	Parks‐Leduc,	Feldman,	&	Bardi,	2014	and	Roccas	et	al.,	2002).	
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include the element of independent thinking. Therefore, the relationship of openness to change 
values to unethicality may be context-dependent; People who value openness to change may 
behave unethically when the expected ethical behavior limits their freedom to engage in a 
desired action and they do not agree with the rule. However, in all other cases they are not prone 
to behave unethically. 
Based on the conceptual links between unethicality and the different value dimensions, 
we regard self-enhancement as having the strongest and clearest theoretical link to unethicality, 
with the opposing self-transcendence serving more as a motivation to prevent harm to others than 
a drive towards action. Conservation values also hold a similar theoretical link to unethicality in 
serving as driving a self-regulation motivation, overcoming one self to follow norms. Openness 
to change values are less clear in how they might motivate unethicality and they might motivate 
unethicality only under certain circumstances. We therefore expect that self enhancement values 
would have a strong positive relationship with unethicality, while self-transcendence and 
conservation values would show a negative relationship with unethicality. Figure 2 summarizes 
our theoretical model. 
The values theory (Schwartz, 1992) highlights the importance of examining complete 
value systems over the analysis of isolated values when examining attitudes and behavior. The 
key to this is in the idea that “values do not function in isolation from one another but as 
systems” (Schwartz, 1996, p.6). According to Schwartz (1992; 1996), any variable that should be 
positively related to one value should have a coherent pattern of relationships with the entire 
value system. Specifically, it should also be negatively related to the values that stem from a 
conflicting motivation, and its correlations with the ten values should change monotonously as 
one moves around the circle, such that the most positive correlation should be with the value that 
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is postulated to motivate the other variable, and the correlations should become less and less 
positive as one moves around the circle until they become negative with the conflicting 
motivation. This creates a pattern of correlations that forms a sinus shape and is termed 
sinusoidal relations. Indeed, Schwartz (1996) demonstrated such patterns of empirical 
correlations. We expect to find such a sinusoidal pattern of correlations also between the system 
of values and unethicality, such that self-enhancement values would show the strongest positive 
relationship, with a decline through openness to change values and a negative relationship with 
the self-transcendence and conservation values. 
The relationship between value structures and unethicality offers a unique challenge in 
cross-cultural settings. Though issues of morality and ethics may be argued to be culturally and 
perhaps even contextually bound (Haidt, 2001, 2008; Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012), we 
propose that the basic links between values and unethicality are consistent across cultures 
because the basic conflicts and congruities among values are universal. Hence, although self-
enhancement values and unethical conduct may be more prevalent in some cultures (e.g., North 
American, see, e.g., Schwartz, 2004) and in some contexts (e.g., business, see, e.g., Knafo & 
Sagiv, 2004), the links between values and unethicality would be consistent across cultures. This 
is because self-enhancement values tend to motivate unethical conduct due to their emphasis on 
promoting the self at the expenses of others. Similarly, self-transcendence values tend to 
motivate people to reject unethical attitudes and conduct due to their emphasis on overcoming 
selfishness and considering the well-being of others (benevolence) as well as promoting fairness 
and justice (universalism). Finally, conservation values motivate people to avoid unethical 
conduct due to their emphasis on following rules and avoiding danger. Taken together, we aim to 
provide evidence that the values-unethicality link extends beyond cultural boundaries. 
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We subjected the above hypotheses to vigorous tests. In Study 1, we examined how 
personal value systems are related to unethical attitudes by conducting a meta-analysis of 12 
samples using multiple measures of personal values and unethical attitudes. Study 2 extended to 
testing the relationship between personal values and actual behavior. Finally, in Study 3 we 
broadened our investigation to examine naturalistic behavior in a large cross-cultural sample of 
Facebook users.  
Study 1: Meta-analysis - Values and unethical attitudes 
As mentioned above, previous research produced inconsistent findings of values relations 
to unethicality. A meta-analysis is particularly useful in such cases to enable providing an overall 
pattern of findings that extends beyond study design, measures, contexts and cultures. Hence, to 
examine the relationship between personal values and unethicality attitudes we performed a 
meta-analysis on 12 different samples from all over the world using diverse values and 
unethicality measures (N = 105,928).  
Table 1 details all samples included in the data collection, with the sample size, country, 
and the measures used. Of the 12 samples, 10 samples (N = 2,870) were specifically collected for 
the purpose of this investigation and measured personal values and unethicality attitudes using 
established scales. The two other samples (N = 103,058) were large archived datasets – the 
European Social Survey (ESS, round 5, 2010) and the World Values Survey (WVS, 2008) that 
both included measures of values and self-reported items relating to attitudes of unethicality.  
Measures 
Personal values. Table 2 summarizes the measures used for assessing personal values 
with further details provided in the supplementary materials. 
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Unethicality Attitudes. The different studies in the meta-analysis included different 
measures of unethicality attitudes. We adapted the Business Ethics Scale developed by Farh, 
Burton, and Hegarty (1999) to measure individual orientations for business ethics. We chose this 
scale due to its former successful application in cross cultural samples that included Chinese, 
Hong Kong, Taiwanese, and American participants. The scale includes 26 one-sentence 
statements describing behaviors relevant to five categories of business ethics: (a) usurpation of 
company resources (e.g., "Use company resources for your own purpose"), (b) corporate 
gamesmanship (e.g., "Claim credit for peer's work"), (c) cheating customers (e.g., "Substitute a 
cheaper part than the contract calls for if it will work just as well"), (d) concealment of 
misconduct (e.g., "Not report co-workers' violation of the law"), and (e) offering kickback (e.g., 
"Offer a potential customer a paid holiday weekend"). We asked participants to evaluate each 
statement as either personally acceptable or unacceptable behavior on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
totally unacceptable; 5 = totally acceptable). Since all statements refer to unethical behavior, a 
high score on the scale indicates that the participant judged the unethical behavior to be 
acceptable, thus suggesting a higher level of unethicality, whereas a low score indicates a low 
level of unethicality. This scale was used in samples 1 to 6 and 9.  
The ESS dataset included three items describing unethical behavior – "making 
exaggerated or false insurance claims", "buying stolen goods," and "committing traffic offences." 
For each of those items, participants were asked to indicate their perception of whether that 
behavior is wrong (1 = not wrong at all; 4 = seriously wrong, reverse coded).  
The WVS dataset included four items describing unethical behavior – "claiming 
government benefits to which you are not entitled", "avoiding a fare on public transport", 
"cheating on taxes if you have a chance", and "someone accepting a bribe in the course of their 
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duties." For each of those behaviors, participants were asked to rate whether the behavior is 
justifiable or not (1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable). For both the ESS and the WVS, 
the unethicality score was the average of the unethicality items.  
Unethical decision making. To measure orientation towards unethical behavior, we 
administered the Unethical Decision Making Scale (Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008) that 
measures likeliness to engage in unethical behavior. Rather than looking at the acceptability of 
unethical behaviors, this scale includes short scenarios, each one presenting a situation in which 
one has an interest to behave unethically. We asked participants to indicate on a seven-point 
scale (0 = not at all likely; 6 = highly likely) the likeliness that they will engage in eight unethical 
behaviors such as stealing office supplies, cheating in an exam, copying licensed software, and 
resubmitting an old project.  
Meta-analysis procedure 
We ran a meta-analysis of all 12 samples together (N = 105,928) to measure the overall 
effects the relationship between the personal values and cheating. The procedure used was based 
on the Hunter and Schmidt (2004) meta-analytic method, with corrections for unreliability and 
sampling error (SPSS syntax adjusted from Field & Gillett, 2010). We computed the effect size 
of the four high-order personal values (self enhancement, self transcendence, etc.) followed by 
each of 10 underlying types of personal values (power, achievement, etc.).  
Meta-analysis results and discussion 
Table 3 displays the results of the meta-analysis. Overall, all four high-order values 
dimensions show a generalizable effect size (80% credibility interval does not include zero) with 
self-enhancement showing the strongest positive relationship (ρ = .31, CI [.27, .35]), a weaker 
effect for openness to change (ρ = .20, CI [.16, .25]), and self-transcendence and conservation 
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showing the strongest negative relationship (ρ = -.25, CI [-.29, -.21] and ρ = -.26, CI [-.31, -.22], 
respectively).  
Looking at the underlying values categories, nine of the ten personal values categories 
demonstrate generalizable effect sizes, with power showing the strongest positive relationship 
with unethicality (ρ = .24, CI [.19, .30]) and conformity showing the strongest negative 
relationship (ρ = -.22, CI [-.30, -.14]). The supplementary materials include further analyses of a 
moderated meta-analysis with sample type as a moderator. 
Figure 3 plots the effect sizes between personal values and unethicality on a graph with 
values listed on the horizontal axis in order. As expected, the plot pattern shows the sinusoidal 
patterns predicted by our theorizing. We calculated shape-consistencies based on a method 
devised specifically for testing sinusoidal patterns of the Schwartz (1992) personal values theory 
by Boer and Fischer (2013). They defined shape-consistency as the extent to which an observed 
value correlations patterns map onto a sinusoidal shape emphasizing either the self-enhancement 
versus self-transcendence dimensions (SET-shape) or the conservation versus openness-to-
change dimensions (OC-shape) (effect sizes: 0.4 - weak consistency, 0.6 - moderate consistency, 
0.8 - strong consistency). See Figure 4 for the shape consistency equation and Table 4 for the 
shape consistency calculations and summary of the results. 
We first tested the two sinusoidal shapes by Boer and Fischer (2013). The meta-analysis 
correlations with unethical behavior showed a SET-shape of -0.62 indicating a moderate 
sinusoidal shape where self-enhancement shows highest unethicality and self-transcendence 
lowest unethicality and an OC-shape of -0.14 indicating no shape consistency with the 
conservation versus openness-to-change dimensions. These first suggests that the overall pattern 
does follow the expected sinusoidal pattern predicted by values theory and that the tension 
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between self-enhancement and self-transcendence values is more prominent than the tension 
between openness-to-change and conservation values. We then proceeded to test our theorized 
sinusoidal pattern in which self-enhancement would show strong positive correlations and both 
self-transcendence and conservation would show strong negative correlations. The sinusoidal 
shape consistency was 0.88 indicating very strong consistency4.  
In summary, a meta-analysis of 12 correlational studies collected from different 
populations from various parts of the world using a variety of scales and methods generally 
confirms the predictive power of personal values on unethicality. Self-enhancement values have 
a positive relationship with unethicality attitudes while self-transcendence and conservation 
values have a negative relationship with unethicality attitudes.  
The relationship between personal values and unethical attitudes was found to be 
generalizable and quite strong, especially considering that personal values are regarded as high-
level abstract notions not often reflected upon in everyday life (see Maio, 2010). Keeping in 
mind that the meta-analytic effect size is a weighted mean of different samples, the emergence of 
the sinusoidal pattern of the relationship between personal values and unethicality from the 
analysis is striking and provides a strong support for the contribution of values theory to the 
understanding of the basic motivations behind unethicality. 
The relationship was stable across sample types, especially so for self-enhancement 
which was mainly driven by power values, self-transcendence which was mainly driven by 
universalism, and conservation which was mainly driven by conformity values. The relationship 
                                                 
4	Examining	the	sinusoidal	patterns	for	the	large	versus	the	small	samples	(see	supplementary	materials),	the	
shape	consistency	for	the	small	samples	was	even	higher	and	closer	to	our	hypothesized	relationships,	
indicating	a	very	high	fit	=.96.		
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was weaker for the openness to change values dimension, mainly because of the weak effect of 
self-direction. 
We tested for and found no cultural moderators. The consistency of the basic findings 
across diverse populations and locations suggests that the relationship is universal. This is not a 
trivial finding considering that morality and ethicality have long been considered to be culturally 
bound (Haidt, 2001, 2008). 
Study 2 - Cheating on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
Study 1 established the link between personal values and unethicality attitudes. Though 
these findings are indicative of actual behaviors, we sought to further verify our findings looking 
at the personal values circumplex and actual unethical behavior. Study 2 was constructed for that 
purpose.  
Prior to running this study, we ran two small scale pretests on undergraduate samples in 
Hong Kong using the Gino, Ayal, and Ariely (2009) unethical behavior task (N1 = 40, N2 = 32). 
The findings reported below are consistent with the findings from both pretests (see 
supplementary materials for more details regarding the pretests and their results). 
The unethical behavior measured in the pretests and the study involved the violation of 
ethical norms by lying in return for monetary gain. This type of unethical behavior is a clear 
violation of norms, but it does not entail any directly identifiable harm to others. Conservation 
values inhibit unethicality related to violation of norms and self-transcendence values inhibit 
unethicality that involves harm to others, and therefore we expected a stronger effect for 
conservation values than for self-transcendence values in the inhibition of these unethical 
behaviors. In this study, the cheating context offered no benefits for those valuing self-direction, 
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and we therefore did not expect that openness-to-change values would be related to this 
behavior. 
Method 
Participants. We recruited participants online using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
in exchange for US$0.10. MTurk is the world's biggest online labor market that connects 
employers (requesters) with workers and provides full and part-time employment for hundreds of 
thousands of people around the world, mainly from the US and India. Indian workers were 
previously found to be more sensitive to monetary incentives (Litman, Robinson, & Rosenzweig, 
2014), more likely to use MTurk as a main source of income (Mason & Suri, 2012), and more 
likely to misreport their real location (Shapiro, Chandler & Muller, 2013). A pretest we ran on 
MTurk using the task below showed only Indian participants as misreporting their location in 
return for monetary gain. We therefore limited the workers in this study to Indian workers. The 
sample included 135 Indian workers (47 females; Mage = 30.90, SDage = 8.89; see supplementary 
materials for details about the pretest and a power analysis). Participants were asked about their 
MTurk work history, completed a personal values scale, and were then presented with an 
opportunity to lie about their country of residence in return for an additional MTurk bonus 
(US$0.02). The low payout and bonus were deliberately chosen as previous literature suggests 
that most people only cheat a little and tend to do so most when they can justify their behavior in 
terms of deservingness (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Participants completed a funneling 
section to probe for possible suspicion regarding the unethical behavior measure. 
Measures. Personal values. The 21 items version of the Portrait Value Questionnaire 
(PVQ-21, see Study 1) was used as a measure of personal values. 
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Unethical behavior. The survey was introduced as being sponsored by a grant from the 
European Union (EU) research council. The unethical behavior measure question explained that 
since the grant is supported by the EU the researchers were obligated under EU regulations to 
pay an additional 20% to EU residents, offered to participants as an MTurk bonus (0.02US$). An 
explanation was added regarding survey anonymity and the inability to determine location due to 
MTurk's global market, proceeded to list the names of all EU countries, and asked participants to 
indicate whether he/she resided in any of the listed countries. We used the built-in Qualtrics 
location tracker to verify that the participants were indeed not located at an EU listed country. 
Cheating behavior was measured as whether the participants indicated they were residing in an 
EU member country. A funneling section at the end of the survey probed for possible suspicion 
regarding the cover story.  
Results and discussion 
Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations of all variables. 
Cheating behavior positively correlated with self-enhancement (r = .20, p = .021) and negatively 
correlated with conservation (r = -.20, p = .018). Cheating behavior was analyzed using a logistic 
regression and revealed a similar pattern (self enhancement: b = 1.27, Wald = 5.07, p = .024, OR 
= 3.57; conservation: b = -1.16, Wald = 4.64, p = .031, OR = .32), yet also showed a significant 
negative effect for openness to change (b = -.91, Wald = 3.85, p = .05, OR = .40). 
Findings reported generally show that the value circumplex is associated with actual 
individual-level unethical behavior. Patterns reported in Study 1 for self-enhancement and 
conservation values extend to actual unethical behavior on a task in an online labor market which 
resembles a workplace. The correlations were weaker than the effects for unethicality attitudes in 
Study 1. This is not surprising as it has been well-established that it is difficult for broad 
Running Head: Values and Unethicality       19 
 
concepts to predict narrow context-specific concepts such as a one-time behavior (Epstein, 
1979).  
As expected, self-transcendence values did not show an effect as these values are 
especially relevant in preventing harm from coming to others. The unethical measure in this 
study (and the matrices task in the pretests) did not involve harm towards anyone specific and 
possibly involved a sense of deservingness for participation compensation which accounts for the 
insignificant effect for self-transcendence values.  
Openness to change showed a negative relationship with unethical behavior. We 
previously reasoned that there is no inherent motivation in these values to be unethical but that 
the free spirited aspect of these values may lead people to sometimes ignore rules. In this task, 
however, there was no motivation for those with high openness-to-change to cheat. On the 
contrary, as part of these values is the motivation to engage in challenges and cheating would 
defeat the purpose of the challenge to prove to themselves that they are perform well on 
academic surveys and on MTurk overall.  
Study 3 - Naturalistic behavior on Facebook 
Studies 1 and 2 showed that values are predictive of unethical attitudes and actual 
unethical behavior. We sought to extend these findings to a naturalistic context, going beyond 
monetary gains in experimental settings to examine everyday behaviors.  
Unethical behaviors violate widely accepted social moral norms. These behaviors are 
challenging for researchers to observe and code (Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014; 
Piff et al., 2012). In this study, we adopted an indirect linguistic approach to detect dishonesty. 
The use of language to tap into people’s psyche dates back to Freud (1901) who analyzed 
patients’ slips of the tongue and Lacan (1968) who argued that the unconscious manifests itself 
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in language use. A growing body of literature has since demonstrated that the language that 
people naturally use in their daily lives can reveal hidden aspects of their personalities, 
cognitions, and behaviors (Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003). The linguistic approach is 
especially useful in the case of dishonesty and deception which – though prevalent – is frowned 
upon when detected and therefore leads those acting dishonestly to try to hide it from others 
(Hancock, 2007; Markowitz & Hancock, 2014; Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 2008).  
To examine dishonesty in a naturalistic setting we observed behavior on a large social 
network - Facebook. In recent years, researchers have begun to make use of social network data 
to gain a better understanding of people’s personality characteristics and behavior (Buffardi & 
Campbell, 2008; Hagger-Johnson, Egan, & Stillwell, 2011; Wang, Kosinski, Stillwell, & Rust, 
2012; Weisbuch, Ivcevic, & Ambady, 2009). Facebook status updates are generally personal 
updates that participants share with their online social network (others approved as “friends”) or 
the general public, and therefore provides an environment where real-life naturalistic behavior 
can be observed in interactions between people. In this case, the dishonesty we refer to is not 
necessarily blunt deception in order to exploit or do harm, but rather a distortion of the truth to 
construe a more socially desirable appearance (Whitty, 2002; Whitty & Gavin, 2001). We 
therefore adopt Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) conceptualization and define dishonesty as the 
likelihood of “a message knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or conclusion 
by the receiver” (p. 205). 
We expected that the effects of values in this study would be weaker due to the crudeness 
of the measures and the naturalistic, uncontrolled setting. Therefore, we considered this a very 
conservative test to our theorizing. If this study replicates the hypothesized effects of values, this 
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would be an important corroborating evidence for the link between personal values and unethical 
behavior. 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
We recruited participants using the myPersonality Facebook application (Kosinski, 
Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013). Participants voluntarily chose to use this application and had given 
their consent and the authorization required for the application to access their online Facebook 
profiles, including demographic data and the user’s status updates (more information about the 
myPersonality Facebook Application is available on the website: http://mypersonality.org/wiki/). 
We limited our analyses to users who used the English version of Facebook (American or British 
locale), had more than 50 Facebook status updates indicative of these users as active on 
Facebook, and who completed the personal values measure. This resulted in a sample of 1,024 
participants (603 female, Mage = 26.18, Mnetwork-size = 183.74). Participants wrote an average of 
268.45 status updates (SD = 254.03) and 4596.71 words (SD = 4783.81; 17.15 words per status). 
Measures 
Personal values. The measures for personal values used were the Schwartz Values 
Survey (Schwartz, 1992, see Study 1).  
Dishonesty. We analyzed the linguistic style in people's writings on their Facebook 
statuses to assess their likelihood for having posted deceptive content. More specifically, we 
adopted Newman and colleagues’ approach where they examined 2300 words and 70 linguistic 
dimensions with the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) text analysis computer-based 
program and concluded that dishonest people tended to use fewer first person pronouns (e.g., I, 
me), fewer third person pronouns (e.g., she, their), fewer exclusive words (e.g., but, exclude), 
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more motion verbs (e.g., arrive, go), and more negative emotions (e.g., worried, fearful; 
Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 2003). These LIWC dimensions indicating the 
likelihood for lying and dishonesty have been supported by several follow-up studies (Bond & 
Lee, 2005; Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth, 2008; see meta-analysis by Hauch, 
Blandón-Gitlin, Masip, & Sporer, 2012). The logic for these specific dimensions was that people 
who are dishonest tend to dissociate themselves from the lie thereby not referring to themselves, 
are likely to feel discomfort by the lie and therefore express more negative feelings, as well as 
tell more complex stories to hide the lie therefore using less cognitively demanding language 
characterized by a lower frequency of exclusive words. 
Newman et al. (2003) created prediction equations using these four LIWC dimensions 
and found that the equations achieved up to 67% lie detection accuracy, which was significantly 
higher than the 52% accuracy achieved by human judges. We chose Newman et al.’s (2003) final 
equation that averaged findings from all their five studies with the most representative 
dishonesty detection accuracy. The four LIWC dimensions, their sample keywords, and betas 
coefficients in each of the two equations are presented in Table 6. To calculate the index for the 
likelihood for dishonesty, we first analyzed participants’ Facebook status updates with LIWC to 
get the amount of usage for each of the four LIWC dimensions (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010; 
usage percentage reported in Table 6). Then we inputted these means into the Newman et al. 
(2003) equation to form an index representing likelihood for dishonesty for each participant. 
Results and discussion 
The descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations of all variables are provided in Table 
7. Self-enhancement positively correlated with likelihood for dishonesty (r = .10, p = .002), 
while self-transcendence showed a negative correlation (r = -.07, p = .021). On the other bi-polar 
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dimensions, openness to change positively correlated with likelihood for dishonesty (r = .08, p = 
.007), while conservation showed a negative association (r = -.09, p = .004). A stepwise 
regression controlling for age and gender showed that the strongest predictor among the personal 
values for likelihood for dishonesty was self-enhancement (β = .05, ΔR2 = .01, p = .006)5.  
Study 3 extended findings from Studies 1 and 2 to a naturalistic setting observing 
people’s everyday life behaviors to show that value structures can be used to predict the 
likelihood for dishonesty on Facebook – a behavior deviant from what is morally acceptable in 
online interactions. The results regarding self-enhancement and conservation replicated from 
Studies 1 and 2 showing those who tend to value self-enhancement and those who tend to not 
value conservation are more likely to engage in dishonesty online. Furthermore, those who value 
self-transcendence tended to show fewer unethical patterns of communication on Facebook, and 
those who value openness to change were more likely to show deceptive behavior on Facebook. 
This differs from results in Study 2 that showed no significant effect of openness to change 
values and a general pattern in the opposite direction. As we discussed earlier, these findings can 
be explained by the motivations behind the unethical measure. In this study, those who value 
openness to change may have a strong motivation to engage in deception in a way that may make 
them appear more unique (self-direction) or as leading more exciting lives in line with their 
values (stimulation). Dishonesty on Facebook may be perceived as involving more harm to 
others than a minor lie towards unidentifiable researchers in Study 2 and can therefore explain 
why self-transcendence values showed a significant effect and inhibited such behavior.  
                                                 
5	In Study 3 all personal values were expected to show an effect with the dependent variable and all correlations 
were significant. Based on the Schwartz (2009) "Proper Use of the Schwartz Value Survey" guidelines, we 
employed a step-wise regression, as the inclusion of all values together in the regression may yield "inaccurate and 
uninterpretable" results.	
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General Discussion 
Our aim was to gain insights into the basic motivations underlying unethical attitudes and 
behaviors. By using the personal values theory (Schwartz, 1992), we were able to show 
consistent and meaningful relations between the entire value system and unethicality. Our 
findings were consistent across 12 samples of relations of values to unethical attitudes in 
different cultures and using different measures (Study 1), and two samples linking values to 
actual unethical behaviors (Studies 2 and 3: workplace behavior on MTurk, and naturalistic 
behavior on Facebook). Table 8 summarizes the findings of all studies. 
 A clear overall picture emerged regarding the underlying motivations of unethicality: 
Across all studies, self-enhancement values tend to be the strongest motivators of unethicality, 
whereas conservation values are the strongest motivators against unethicality. The findings 
regarding self-transcendence and openness to change were more nuanced, yet still consistent for 
when there was a significant effect and in line with our expectations. As can be seen in Table 8, 
there were stronger inhibiting effects of unethicality for self-transcendence when harm was 
directed at others. Links from openness to change to unethicality were generally positive, yet 
more complex as we explicate below. This overall picture of basic motivations of unethicality 
was found across cultures and methods thereby establishing the robustness of this phenomenon. 
A meta-analysis of 12 samples showed a clear relationship between personal values and 
unethicality attitudes. The main analysis showed generalizable effects for all types of values, 
with self-direction being the only exception. We further showed that, despite very diverse 
samples used in the meta-analysis, the effect sizes follow the sinusoidal pattern predicted in our 
hypotheses showing strong support for the values system as predicting unethicality.  
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We further examined whether the relationship between personal values and unethical 
attitudes would be extended to actual unethical behavior. Findings from the behavioral studies 
showed self-enhancement and conservation as having the strongest links to actual unethical 
behavior. Results for self-transcendence and openness to change were not as consistent. We 
discussed possible explanations regarding the samples used and possible differences between the 
value dimensions in driving intentions into actions.  
Taken together, these studies establish the importance of personal values as underlying 
motivations related to unethicality, both in attitudes and in actual behavior. The heterogeneity of 
the samples used also provides strong support for the generalizability and possibly the cross-
cultural applicability of these findings. Despite possible cultural differences in morality and 
value-expressive attitudes and behaviors, these findings suggest that the values-unethicality link 
does extend – at least partially - across cultures. That the sinusoidal relationship of aggregated 
effect sizes across many different samples follows the pattern predicted by the values structure 
further shows strong support for the significance and usefulness of the values theory circumplex. 
Future research 
Our investigation offers several directions for future research beyond the scope of this 
investigation. The findings regarding openness-to-change and self-transcendence values seem to 
affected by certain factors that may either weaken the relationship to unethicality or even reverse 
it. Self-transcendence values inhibit harm to others, and when unethical behavior harms others 
self-transcendence was found to inhibit unethical behavior. Yet, the underlying values of 
benevolence and universalism emphasize care about certain groups of people over concerns for 
the unethicality of the act. Benevolence values promote care for close others and might thereby 
not inhibit unethical behavior if this would help others (such as stealing in order to support a 
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poor family or sick friend) and universalism values aim to promote a global care agenda which 
may lead to not inhibit unethical action against those who are perceived as causing global harm 
(such as action against companies that have environmental impact). Future research can examine 
how the different values inhibit harm towards different groups of people. Quite possibly, self-
transcendence motivations would not provide the self-regulation needed to suppress unethical 
intentions in case unethical action benefits others (see also Grant & Berg, 2011; Morrison, 2006). 
Future research on such situations could contribute to answering recent calls in the literature to 
try and understand when and why pro-social motivations may lead to acts of harm and unethical 
behavior (Grant & Berg, 2011). 
A potential complexity with regard to values as motivational underpinnings of 
unethicality lies with openness to change values. We reasoned above that these too could 
sometimes have opposite motivational forces with regard to unethicality. Specifically, we 
reasoned that although there is no inherent motivation to be unethical in these values, the free-
spirited nature of openness to change values may generally lead to lowered adherence to rules, 
which could enable unethicality, especially if the person does not agree with the rule. On the 
other hand, when the cheating is in a challenging task the challenge loses its meaning once the 
person cheats, and so in these cases openness to change values are likely to motivate avoidance 
of cheating. These more complex relations to values should be examined in future research. 
Theoretical implications  
The findings from the current set of studies have various implications for theoretical 
understanding of morality and more broadly, social/personality psychology. Until now, the 
emphasis in the psychological literature in linking values with unethicality has been on self-
enhancement values (e.g., Pulfrey & Butera, 2013). Indeed, we have also found that these values 
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have the strongest and most consistent links with unethicality. Yet by examining the full 
circumplex of values, we have been able to draw attention to other important values underlying 
unethicality or lack of it – we have shown the important role of conservation and self-
transcendence values in inhibiting unethicality, and we have shown that in some contexts, even 
openness to change values can play a role in motivating or inhibiting unethicality. These new 
emphases broaden the view of motivations underlying unethicality.  
An important theoretical contribution lies in the finding that across cultures, values have 
an overall similar link with unethicality. This suggests that beyond the well-known cultural 
relativism of morality, there are also universal links with basic motivations: across cultures self-
enhancement values motivate unethicality, and conservation and self-transcendence values 
motivate avoiding unethicality. 
Finally, the current set of studies suggests that different values may motivate or inhibit 
unethicality in different contexts: it seems that self-transcendence values are the main inhibitors 
of unethicality when there is a clear victim to the unethical behavior. In contrast, when the 
unethical conduct does not directly harm any person but generally violates rules and norms 
conservation values are the ones inhibiting unethicality. It seems that openness to change values 
may sometimes motivate unethicality (e.g., when the person does not agree with the rule) and 
sometimes inhibit unethicality (e.g., when unethical conduct takes away the challenge in 
pursuing a goal). This pattern of initial findings opens up possibilities for pinpointing 
interactions with contexts of unethicality, which can advance the sophistication of understanding 
of morality and social behavior and therefore merit further research. 
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Conclusion 
This research demonstrated that personal values are an important factor in understanding 
unethicality and that there is a consistent and meaningful relationship between value systems and 
unethical attitudes and behavior. We demonstrated that this relationship follows the values 
theory sinusoidal pattern over unethicality and extends across contexts, general life ethical 
dilemmas, and to actual behavior, even in naturalistic everyday life. This research opens up 
many possibilities both for further research questions and for applications and we hope that it 
will stimulate such future work. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Meta analysis list of collected studies 
 
# Sample 
population 
N Values 
Measure
Unethicality Measure Country  
1 Students 204 SVS Unethicality attitudes  China – Guangzhou 
2 Students 216 SVS Unethicality attitudes  China – Shanghai 
3 Students 250 SVS Unethicality attitudes  Hong Kong 
4 Students 262 SVS Unethicality attitudes  Taiwan 
5 Students 196 SVS Unethicality attitudes  Singapore 
6 Students 196 SVS Unethicality attitudes  China - Shanghai 
7 Students 315 SSVS Unethical decision 
making (JAP, 2008) 
Hong Kong 
8 Students 603 PVQ-21 Unethical decision 
making (JAP, 2008) 
Hong Kong 
9 Yourmorals.org 476 SVS Unethicality attitudes  International 
10 MTurk 158 PVQ Unethical decision 
making (JAP, 2008) 
International 
11 European Social 
Survey 
50781  
 
ESS Unethicality attitudes (3 
items) 
Europe  
(32 countries) 
12 World Values 
Survey 
52277  
 
SSVS Unethicality attitudes (4 
items) 
International  
(40 countries) 
 
 
Table 2 
Measures of personal values used in the meta-analysis 
 
Measure name Citation Items Scale Samples # 
Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) Schwartz, 1992, 1994 57  9-point 1-6, 9 
Short SVS (SSVS) Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005 10 9-point 7, 12 
Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ) Schwartz et al., 2001 40 6-point 10 
Short PVQ (PVQ-21) European Social Survey 21 6-point 8, 11 
Note. Further details regarding the scales are provided in the supplementary materials. Items 
were mean centered and averaged to create the ten theorized types of value and the four high 
order values dimensions (as recommended by Schwartz, 2009 and Parks-Leduc, Feldman, & 
Bardi, 2014)  
 
 
Table 3 
 
Main meta-analysis results 
 
Values Categories k N Mean r ρ SDr SDρ LCV HCV % Var 
Power (SE) 12 105928 .16 .24 .02 .04 .19 .30 12.20 
Achievement (SE) 12 105928 .10 .13 .02 .02 .11 .16 36.18 
Hedonism 12 105928 .13 .18 .05 .07 .09 .28 3.76 
Stimulation (OC) 12 105928 .16 .21 .03 .04 .16 .26 11.43 
Self Direction (OC) 12 105928 .03 .04 .03 .04 -.01 .10 14.45 
Universalism (ST) 12 105928 -.14 -.20 .02 .04 -.25 -.15 13.36 
Benevolence (ST) 12 105928 -.11 -.15 .02 .02 -.18 -.12 29.02 
Conformity (CO) 12 105928 -.15 -.22 .04 .06 -.30 -.14 5.71 
Tradition (CO) 12 105928 -.12 -.20 .04 .08 -.29 -.10 5.26 
Security (CO) 12 105928 -.10 -.14 .02 .03 -.18 -.10 17.43 
Values Dimensions k N Mean r ρ SDr SDρ LCV HCV % Var 
Self-Enhancement 12 105928 .21 .31 .04 .03 .27 .35 18.18 
Self-Transcendence  12 105928 -.16 -.25 .02 .03 -.29 -.21 20.65 
Openness to Change 12 105928 .13 .20 .03 .03 .16 .25 16.76 
Conservation 12 105928 -.18 -.26 .04 .03 -.31 -.22 14.87 
Note: k = number of studies; N = total number of individuals across all studies; Mean r = 
the average of the uncorrected correlations; ρ = the estimated true score correlation; SDr = 
standard deviation of mean r; SDρ = the standard deviation of the corrected correlations; LCV = 
Low Credibility Value – this is the lower limit of the 80% credibility interval; HCV = High 
Credibility Value – this is the upper limit of the 80% credibility interval; % Var = the percentage 
of variance that was accounted for by statistical artifacts (sampling error and unreliability of 
measures). (SE)=self enhancement dimension; (OC) = openness to change dimension; (ST) = 
self transcendence dimension; (CO) = conservation dimension. Bolded scores have an 80% 
credibility interval that does not include 0.  
 
Table 4 
 
Sinusoidal shape consistency values 
 
Values Categories SET-shape OC-shape Theorized-shape 
Power (SE) -0.95 0.59 0.95 
Achievement (SE) -0.95 0 0.95 
Hedonism -0.59 -0.59 0.59 
Stimulation (OC) 0 -0.95 0 
Self Direction (OC) 0.59 -0.05 0 
Universalism (ST) 0.95 -0.59 -0.95 
Benevolence (ST) 0.95 0 -0.95 
Conformity (CO) 0 0.95 -0.95 
Tradition (CO) 0.59 0.59 -0.59 
Security (CO) -0.59 0.95 -0.59 
Meta correlations consistency -.62 -.14 0.88 
Consistency summary Moderate None Very strong 
Note. SET-shape (self-transcendence versus self-enhancement) and OC-shape (openness-
to-change versus conservation) values were adapted from Boer and Fischer (2013).  
Theorized-shape is based on theorizing of correlation with unethical behavior in the introduction.  
Consistency effect size guide: 0.4 - weak; 0.6 - moderate; 0.8 - strong. 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Study 2 - Descriptive statistics and correlations table 
  
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 - Cheating .13 .33 -      
2 - Self-enhancement -.21 .46 .20* (.81)     
3 - Self-transcendence .17 .42 .10 -.48*** (.89)    
4 - Openness to change .11 .47 -.14 -.25** -.20* (.88)   
5 - Conservation 0 .40 -.20* -.53*** -.16 -.32*** (.87)  
6 - Age 30.90 8.88 -.06 -.22 .15 -.02 .14 - 
7 - Gender - - -.09 -.27 .17 .01 .16 .12 
Note: N = 135. Values on the diagonal in parentheses are alpha coefficients. Correlations 
for personal values dimensions are based on iptized scores (Schwartz, 2009). Gender was 
dummy coded as male = 1 and female = 0. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (1-tailed) 
 
Table 6 
 
Study 3 - Word analysis LIWC categories & keywords 
LIWC dimensions Sample LIWC keywords Honesty 
Equation βs 
Percentage 
use in  
this study 
1st person pronouns I, me, mine 0.260 4.22% 
3rd person pronouns She, her, him, they, their 0.250 0.93% 
Exclusive words But, without, exclude 0.419 1.94% 
Motion verbs Arrive, go –0.259 1.55% 
Negative emotion Worried, fearful, nervous, 
hate, annoy, crying, sad 
–0.217 2.04% 
 
 
Table 7 
 
Study 3 – Means, standards deviations and correlations 
 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Dishonesty 0 1 -     
2. Self Enhancement -.75 .91 .10** (.92)    
3. Self-Transcendence .39 .85 -.07* -.39*** (.95)   
4. Openness to change .24 .93 .08** .17*** -.11*** (.92)  
5. Conservation -.62 .77 -.09** -.30*** -.19*** -.64*** (.93) 
Age 26.18 12.12 .05 -.12*** .04 -.05 .04 
Gender .59 .49 -.17*** -.10** .09** -.11*** .05┬ 
Note: N = 1024. Values on the diagonal in parentheses are alpha coefficients. 
Correlations for personal values dimensions are based on iptized scores (Schwarz, 2009). Gender 
was dummy coded as male = 0 and female = 1. ┬ p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (1-
tailed) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
 
Summary of findings 
 
# N Sample characteristics Unethicality 
type 
SE ST OC CO 
Study 1  105,928 8 student samples 
1 Yourmorals.org 
1 MTurk 
European Social Survey 
World Values Survey 
Unethicality 
attitudes  
.31 -.25 .20 -.26 
Study 2 
pretests 
72 Students Cheating .38 -.01 -.10 -.20 
Study 2 135 MTurk Cheating .20 .10 -.14 -.20 
Study 3 1,024 Internationals on Facebook Dishonesty 
 
.10 
 
-.07 
 
.08 
 
-.09 
 
Note: Bolded values are significant effects. SE: Self-enhancement; ST: Self-transcendence; OC: 
Openness to Change; CO: Conservation 
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Figure 1. The theoretical structure of personal values.  
 
Figure 2. Personal values high-order dimensions mapping according to types and levels of 
unethicality 
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Figure 3. Study 1 - Plot for personal values and unethicality expected pattern and effect sizes  
 
 
Figure 4. The shape consistency equation (Boer & Fischer, 2013); x is the meta-analysis effects 
vector (see ρ values in Table 3), y is the expected sinusoidal pattern vector (see Table 4), and n is 
the number of effects (=10 values). 
 
 
 
 
